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This paper studies how credit constraints develop over bank relationships. I analyze a unique 
dataset  of  matched  loan  application  and  loan  contract  information  and  measure  credit 
constraints as the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts. I find that the most important 
determinants of receiving smaller than requested loan amounts are firm age and size at the 
time  of  the  first  interaction  between  borrower  and  bank.  Over  loan  sequences,  credit 
constraints decease most pronouncedly in the beginning of relationships and for the initially 
young and small firms. Moreover, the structure of the dataset allows me to disentangle the 
demand  and  supply  effects  behind  these  observed  credit  constraints.  I  find  that  the  gap 
between  requested  and  granted  loan  amounts  decreases  because  both  sides  converge.  If 
previous credit constraints were large, requested amounts increase more moderately, while 
granted amounts increase more strongly than in the case of small previous constraints. The 
findings are a sign of the use of dynamic incentives at the bank side to overcome information 
problems when contracting repeatedly with opaque borrowers. The results further suggest 
that, particularly in the beginning of a bank relationship, borrowers learn from their previous 
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1 Introduction 
 
  The nature of a bank-borrower relationship may be characterized as a “mutual 
commitment” (Boot and Marinc (2008)). Yet, while the literature has shown that banks 
collect and process a variety of (proprietary) information and how this may reduce credit 
constraints, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on the evolution of borrowers’ 
demand for credit and its interaction with banks’ supply of credit over bank relationships. 
This paper makes a first step to address this interaction by investigating how requested and 
granted loan amounts evolve over bank relationships and how they are influenced by previous 
contractual outcomes in a sequence of loans.  
  I employ a unique dataset of matched loan applications and loan contracts that includes 
both requested and granted loan terms as well as borrower and relationship characteristics at 
the time of loan origination. The dataset consists of nearly 99,000 loans to small enterprises 
extended by one bank in Bulgaria over the period April 2003 to September 2007. As most of 
these small loans are of comparatively short maturities I am able to follow loan sequences 
with up to nine loans within the observation period. Analyzing chains of short-term repeat 
loans complements studies that focus on credit lines to assess how banks use the information 
they gather from multiple interactions with their borrowers (e.g. Berger and Udell (1995) and 
Norden and Weber (2010)). 
Exploiting the structure of my dataset, I measure credit constraints as the ratio of 
requested to granted loan amounts and investigate not only how this ratio relates to firm 
characteristics but also how it evolves over sequential loan contracts. Previous papers point 
out that both demand and supply side factors determine credit availability and loan terms (e.g. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Qian and Strahan (2007)). In a second step, I therefore study 
requested and granted loan amounts separately to gain deeper insights into the dynamic 
processes on both the demand and supply side and to determine the borrower’s and the bank’s 
reactions to the degree of credit constraints at the previous loan. The dynamic patterns of 
requested and granted loan amounts that arise when borrowers contract repeatedly with the 
same lender have not yet been comprehensively established.  
The results show that borrowers are considerably credit constrained in the outset of their 
bank relationships. The most important determinants of receiving smaller than requested loan 
amounts are firm age and size at the time of the first interaction between borrower and bank. 
This indicates that the extent of (publicly) available information matters for initial differences 
in credit constraints between borrowers. Apart from that, a reduction in information   3 
asymmetries resulting from repeated interactions crucially determines credit constraints. I find 
that observed credit constraints decrease over loan sequences with this effect being most 
distinct in the beginning of the relationship. This finding provides a first indication of the 
evolution of borrowers’ requests over multiple interactions with the same lender. It rules out 
that borrowers overstate their demand as a reaction to previous constraints because this would 
not induce the observed reduction in credit constraints. I also find that the decrease in 
observed credit constraints over time is especially pronounced for the initially young and 
small firms. This is a sign for the use of dynamic incentives at the bank side to overcome 
information problems when contracting repeatedly with small and opaque borrowers.  
Further disentangling demand from supply effects reveals that observed credit constraints 
decrease over a loan sequence due to a convergence of the demand and supply sides. While 
both borrowers’ requested and the bank’s granted loan amounts rise over time, they differ in 
their reaction to previous credit constraints. When the extent of previous credit constraints is 
large in the beginning of the relationship, requested amounts increase more moderately 
whereas granted amounts increase more strongly than in the case of small previous 
constraints. These findings imply that borrowers learn from previous experiences. If the 
feedback they get from an interaction is negative, i.e. if they receive a smaller than requested 
loan amount, they adjust their request at the subsequent interaction accordingly to avoid being 
highly constrained again. At the same time, the results confirm that the bank uses dynamic 
incentives to overcome information problems increasing loan sizes disproportionately after 
due repayment when contracting repeatedly. This is in line with arguments that bank 
relationships are valuable because banks are able to collect and assess information in due 
course and benefit borrowers by better loan terms over time.  
My approach differs from earlier papers on the credit availability of small firms in two 
important ways. First, in contrast to previous studies relying on indirect (e.g. Petersen and 
Rajan (1994, 1995)) or equilibrium outcome (e.g. Ioannidou and Ongena (2010)) proxies of 
credit availability it provides a more comprehensive measure of credit constraints because it 
incorporates loan demand. Secondly, while studies analyzing the influence of relationship and 
firm characteristics on the likelihood of being denied credit do consider loan applications they 
deal with borrower rationing (e.g. Cole (1998)). My study, on the contrary, is concerned with 
loan size constraints for those borrowers who receive credit.
1  
                                                 
1 Keeton (1979) distinguishes between these two forms of credit constraints. If information is distributed 
asymmetrically, banks may ration borrowers (type I constraints) to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard 
which would negatively impact their profit (see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Jaffee and Russell (1976) derive that 
granting lower than requested loan amounts (type II constraints) may serve as a sorting device because   4 
The main contribution of this paper consists in providing first evidence on the dynamic 
patterns that arise when bank and borrower interact repeatedly by disentangling demand and 
supply effects behind observed credit constraints. Thereby, it amends existing findings on the 
supply side (see Ioannidou and Ongena (2010)) and adds to the very recently emerging 
literature that aims at distinguishing between demand and supply effects in bank lending 
(Brown, Kirschenmann and Ongena (2009), Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2009), Cheng and 
Degryse (2010) and Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2010)). 
Finally, the panel structure of the employed dataset makes it possible to add to the 
existing literature on bank relationships from a methodological point of view by addressing 
the fact that borrowers non-randomly drop out of the sample. I empirically model this attrition 
process in a two-stage procedure that accounts for sample selection at each interaction 
between borrowers and bank. Cross-sectional studies may not be fully able to control for 
potential changes in the composition of the pool of borrowers over time (see also Ioannidou 
and Ongena (2010). I find that the extent of credit constraints does not seem to matter for 
selection, i.e. the probability to take out another loan. While the analysis reveals that there is 
an attrition bias in the data, the main results are robust to explicitly accounting for the attrition 
process.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 provides institutional details on the loan 
granting process and describes the data while section 4 presents the findings from the 
empirical analyses. Section 5 concludes.    
 
2 Literature overview 
 
2.1 The evolution of requested and granted loan amounts over multiple interactions   
 Theories of financial intermediation constitute that banks are able to accumulate 
extensive private information about their borrowers through screening and monitoring 
(Diamond (1984), Ramakrishan and Thakor (1984), Fama (1985) and Boyd and Prescott 
(1986)). Especially relationship lending, i.e. multiple interactions with the same borrower 
over time (Boot (2000)), seems well suited to provide banks with (proprietary) information on 
their customers. Multiple interactions with the same borrower leave room for the bank to set 
dynamic incentives to deal with agency problems in an environment with asymmetric 
                                                                                                                                                          
borrowers with a utility increase from defaulting are discouraged from borrowing as their benefits (i.e. larger 
loan sizes) decrease. 
   5 
information. In the model of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) financial constraints arise 
endogenously as an enforcement device to ensure repayment because the credible threat to 
terminate funding discourages borrowers from diverting funds. Armendariz de Aghion and 
Murdoch (2005) extend this model and show that the effect of dynamic incentives may be 
reinforced by providing increased funding upon due repayment. Furthermore, the game-
theoretic structure of the two-period model in Egli (2004) explains that reputation acquisition 
is essential for borrowers to sustain the relationship with the bank in order to obtain further 
funding in the future. Expanding on this argument, Egli, Ongena and Smith (2006) highlight 
that relationship financing allows borrowers to benefit from better loan terms if strategic 
default is easy, e.g. in countries with weak accounting and judicial standards. The reason is 
that lenders who finance several projects up-front have to charge very high interest rates to be 
compensated for the risk of strategic default. Finally, Martinelli (1997) provides a rationale 
for the specific value of dynamic incentives in bank lending to very young firms that have not 
yet established a credit history or reputation. 
Summarizing, dynamic incentives provide a way to test a borrower’s repayment ability 
and willingness with small loan amounts in the beginning of the relationship. Loan amounts 
then gradually increase upon positive repayment behavior so that setting dynamic incentives 
serves as an enforcement device and enables the bank to closely monitor the borrower in early 
stages of the relationship.
2 Therefore, I expect granted loan amounts to increase over repeated 
interactions between borrowers and bank. Besides, the increase is expected to be more 
pronounced for informationally opaque borrowers such as young firms. 
Models dealing with the borrower side in bank-borrower relationships mainly 
concentrate on the costs (Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and von Thadden (2004)) and benefits 
(Boot and Thakor (1994), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and von Thadden (1995)) 
borrowers incur from multiple interactions with the same lender. However, multiple 
interactions between borrower and bank may be interpreted as a strategic game in which both 
actors have to learn about the game and the other player. Requested (and granted) loan 
amounts therefore possibly depend on previous outcomes of loan contracting.  
Considering borrowers’ behavior, two scenarios seem possible when borrowers approach 
the bank for the first time, request a certain loan amount and are granted only a lower than 
requested amount after the financial analysis. On the one hand, borrowers may learn which 
                                                 
2 This concept of starting small is also established in the corporate finance literature (e.g. Tirole (2006)) to model 
so-called staged financing, in the industrial organization literature to explain the development of business 
partnerships in states of uncertainty (e.g. Rauch and Watson (2003)) and in the venture capital literature when 
venture projects are financed under uncertainty and the threat of moral hazard (e.g. Bergemann and Hege (1998) 
and Wang and Zhou (2004)).    6 
projects the bank will possibly finance and which loan amounts to request when applying for 
further loans. Such an adaptation of requested loan amounts should reduce observed credit 
constraints over loan sequences. Besides, it implies that borrowers who were granted a 
considerably lower than requested amount at the previous interaction should place a more 
moderate request at the next interaction compared to borrowers who received the amount they 
requested. The literature on borrower behavior in the credit market is scarce. For instance, 
Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix and Laibson (2008) model and test learning dynamics in a credit 
card market where clients seem to learn to avoid paying future fees through negative 
feedback, i.e. the experience of past fees.  
On the other hand, it seems plausible to assume that borrowers who received a lower than 
requested loan amount at the previous interaction may react by overstating the requested 
amount for the next loan accordingly. This implies that observed credit constraints would 
persist, especially in the beginning of a bank relationship, although granted loan amounts per 
se may increase. A parallel argument can be found in papers that investigate overbidding in 
the fixed-interest repo auctions the European Central Bank (EBC) used to conduct.
3 Based on 
the stylized repo game model of Nautz and Oechssler (2003), Ehrhart (2001) shows in an 
experimental study that bid sizes as well as the extent of overbidding increase over time when 
the planned allotment is smaller than bidders’ true demand. Bidders are found to follow a 
myopic best-reply behavior, i.e. for the current bid they take into account the ratio of their 
true demand to their individual allotment at their previous bid. Nautz and Oechssler (2006) 
confirm these experimental findings analyzing data from the EBC and the Bundesbank.
4   
   
2.2 Related empirical studies 
This study contributes to three strands of the empirical banking and finance literature: 
relationship lending, demand and supply effects in bank lending and the determinants of 
credit availability for small firms. 
Empirical studies on relationship lending have used a variety of proxies such as the 
length, number, scale and scope of bank relationships to capture the intensity of the 
relationship and the extent of asymmetric information. Yet, it is not clear from this approach 
how exactly banks collect and process information. One possibility for banks to gather 
information over time is to observe their borrowers’ usage of credit lines (Berger and Udell 
                                                 
3 In these auctions, the EBC announces a repo rate and banks simply state which amount they would like to 
receive at this cost. If total bids exceed the planned allotment, banks are rationed proportionally to their bids.   
4 The myopic best-reply behavior may be an argument for overstated requested loan amounts at the second 
interaction between borrower and bank in my setting. However, the bank is likely to react to such a behavior 
while the repo auction procedure is purely mechanical on the central bank’s side.     7 
(1995)). While Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina (2009) examine the determinants of credit line 
usage, Norden and Weber (2010) find that banks indeed use the information gained from 
observing borrowers’ credit line usage and account activity in managing their relationships. 
For instance, if banks receive early warning signals from limit violations, they increase credit 
spreads on subsequent loans made to these borrowers. Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2010) 
confirm that observing the usage of credit lines provides banks with the most valuable private 
information. 
This study complements the literature on information production in bank relationships by 
analyzing a chain of short-term repeat loans as another possibility for banks to gather 
information from multiple interactions with the same customer. Following bank and 
borrowers from their first interaction over several loan contracts allows me to explore how 
banks make use of dynamic incentives to deal with risks arising from asymmetric information 
and how this learning process translates into granted loan terms. 
Very few recent papers examine demand and supply effects in bank lending. Cheng and 
Degryse (2010) find that the introduction of a public credit registry alleviates informational 
barriers and reduces credit rationing in the Chinese credit card market when studying demand 
and supply separately. Focusing on the impact of macroeconomic and financial shocks on 
bank lending, Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2010) study how the balance-sheet 
strengths of Spanish banks and firms influence credit availability thus separating demand and 
supply effects on the probability that a loan request results in a loan granted. Concerning their 
relationship measures, they observe that longer and fewer bank relationships positively 
influence credit availability. Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2009) examine how the US financial 
crisis affected retail bank lending at German savings banks. They find that demand decreases 
at all savings banks while savings banks that were affected by the financial crisis reject 
substantially more loan applications than non-affected banks. They also find that loan 
applications of customers with previous relationships with an affected bank are less likely to 
be rejected than those of new customers.  
This paper extends the existing evidence on demand and supply effects in bank lending 
by explicitly exploiting a panel data structure and analyzing requested and granted loan 
amounts in a sequence of interactions between borrowers and a bank. It is, to the best of my 
knowledge, the first study to provide evidence of the dynamic patterns that arise on both the 
demand and the supply side when bank and borrowers contract repeatedly over time. In that 
respect, it is closest to Ioannidou and Ongena (2010). Using a panel dataset, they follow 
borrowers over several interactions with lenders and study contracted loan terms before and   8 
after borrowers switch banks. Thereby they are able to establish the dynamic patterns that 
arise on the supply side when firms start new relationships and interact repeatedly with one 
lender. This paper adds the demand side to the analysis. So far, the literature has been 
relatively silent on how exactly loan negotiations work
5 and how bank and borrower react to 
previous contractual outcomes. 
Finally, this study relates to the literature on the influence of bank relationships on credit 
availability of small firms. Existing empirical studies generally find a positive relation 
between various measures of relationship strength and credit availability. Petersen and Rajan 
(1994, 1995) use an indirect measure of credit constraints, the percentage of trade credits paid 
late. They find that the length and scope of the relationship and borrowing from fewer lenders 
positively influence credit availability. While these papers have established the value of close 
bank relationships on the availability of credit for small firms, they have not been able to 
directly observe borrowers’ requests and relate them to the actual loan terms granted by the 
bank. Without this information, it is not clear whether the indirect proxy captures loan size 
constraints or borrower rationing. 
Harhoff and Körting (1998) also find a positive influence of borrowing from fewer 
lenders on credit availability. Cole (1998) and Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998) establish 
that the valuable private information seems to be gathered very early in the relationship. 
Machauer and Weber (1998) confirm that close bank relationships are beneficial for firms 
since they obtain more finance when borrowing from their hausbanks, while Elsas and 
Krahnen (1998) find that especially risky borrowers benefit from bank relationships. Scott 
(2006) shows that loan officer turnover, which is connected with a loss of soft information, is 
positively related to the probability that banks deny credit. Finally, Bodenhorn (2007) and 
Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) find that bank relationships play a crucial role in obtaining 
larger contracted loan amounts.  
  This paper uses a more comprehensive measure of credit availability: the ratio of 
requested to granted loan amounts for those borrowers receiving credit. One caveat to this 
approach, however, is that it assumes requested and granted loan amounts to mirror ‘real’ 
demand and supply although both may be driven by strategic considerations. Whereas the 
dataset at hand does not allow me to fully resolve this issue, it takes the analysis of credit 
availability one step further by incorporating loan applications and shedding some first light 
on strategic processes.  
 
                                                 
5 One exception are the papers studying borrower bargaining power (e.g. Uchida (2006), Santos and Winton 
(2009) and Grunert and Norden (2010)).   9 
3 Data and methodology 
 
3.1 The data and the Bank’s loan granting process   
The dataset used in this study comprises all annuity loans, credit lines and overdrafts to 
firms extended by one Bulgarian bank (henceforth called the “Bank”) between April 2003 and 
September 2007. The Bank is a nationwide full-service bank with a large branch network in 
both urban and rural areas. It provides credit and other financial products (e.g. savings 
products, payment services, credit cards, leasing) to private and business clients with a special 
focus on lending to small enterprises. For each loan the dataset includes information from the 
borrowers’ loan applications on the loan terms that were requested. I match this information 
with data on the actually granted loan terms as stated in the loan contracts as well as with 
borrower characteristics and relationship indicators at the time of loan origination. Definitions 
of all variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
All observations with missing loan or firm-level data are excluded. Since the following 
empirical analysis focuses on the evolution of requested and granted loan sizes and their 
relation over a loan sequence, all loans after the ninth are excluded due to very few 
observations in these categories. Based on the fact that interest rate and collateral 
requirements are fixed for small loans whereas they are individually negotiated in the loan 
granting process for medium loans (loans with amounts of more than 50,000 EUR), 
eventually all medium loans are excluded from the main analysis. This leads to the final 
sample of 98,987 loans to 58,642 firms comprising 32,832 single loan clients and 25,810 
repeat clients with loan sequences of up to nine loans. 
At the heart of the Bank’s lending technology is a thorough analysis of the borrower’s 
debt capacity. Approaching the Bank, a borrower first of all meets a Client Advisor who 
assesses whether the borrower meets the Bank’s basic requirements. If the borrower does so, 
she has to fill in a loan application form. To begin with and most importantly, she is asked to 
indicate her preferred loan amount, maturity and currency and the purpose of the loan. She 
also has to provide information about the firm, other bank relations and the amount she can 
spare monthly for the repayment of the loan. In a next step, the Bank’s credit administration 
prepares information on the borrower’s credit history with this Bank and other banks to check 
her repayment behavior and loyalty to the Bank. At the same time, the loan officer conducts   10 
the financial analysis which includes a personal visit to the borrower’s site. Eventually, the 
loan officer presents the customer’s request and the suggested loan terms together with the 
information gathered during the financial analysis to the Bank’s credit committee which 
makes the final decision on the granted loan terms. Collateral requirements and interest rates 
are fixed and consequently do not play a role in the individual loan contracting process for my 
sample of small loans (loans with amounts of up to 50,000 EUR). Therefore, I will not 
explicitly consider these loan terms throughout the empirical analysis. 
Concentrating the analysis on small loans from one bank in an emerging market provides 
an ideal ground for studying the influence of bank relationships on requested and granted loan 
terms because informational asymmetries are presumably severe. The bank’s standardized 
loan contracts for small loans leave only loan amount (and maturity
6) as means for the bank to 
deal with borrowers’ credit risks. The sample is therefore well suited to study the adjustment 
of these loan terms during the loan granting process. Finally, since the loan granting process 
is the same for all observed loans possible heterogeneity is reduced at this level. 
 
3.2 The ratio of requested to granted loan amounts 
Since I observe requested and granted loan amounts I am able to establish the extent to 
which borrowers receive a smaller loan amount than they requested. I denote this as observed 
credit constraints and measure it by the Requested-granted ratio (the higher the ratio the more 
constrained the borrower). Table 2 reveals that the Bank’s decision to grant smaller than 
requested amounts strongly depends on the extent of asymmetric information. To clearly 
capture the effect of different levels of asymmetric information between borrowers and to 
separate it from the effect of repeated interactions over time only first loans are included in 
the calculations. Two proxies for firm opaqueness widely used in the banking literature are 
firm age (e.g. Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001)) and firm size (e.g. Berger and Udell (1995) 
and Petersen and Rajan (1995)). I define Initially young firms as those with firm age of up to 
two years at their first loan because such firms have not had the time to establish a public 
track record (see Petersen and Rajan (1994)). To define Initially small firms, I follow Petersen 
and Rajan (1995) and split the sample at the median value of firm size at the first loan. 
Besides, results are presented for the two subsamples of single loan vs. repeat clients to assess 
whether the extent of observed credit constraints influences the borrower’s decision to request 
a further loan. 
 
                                                 
6 Since amount and maturity are found to be complementary contract terms, the analysis mainly focuses on 
requested and granted loan amounts.   11 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 shows that loan size constraints are significantly larger for the Initially young 
than for the initially old firms and that this result holds for the single loan and the repeat 
clients. Findings for the Initially small vs. initially large firms are very similar with 
differences between the two groups being even more pronounced. Thus, Table 2 clearly 
indicates that these measures of asymmetric information play an important role in the Bank’s 
decision to grant a lower than requested amount. Interestingly, the difference-in-difference 
estimates (in bold) show that these differences between the initially young vs. old and initially 
small vs. large firms are significantly larger for the single loan clients. However, taking a 
closer look at the single loan vs. repeat clients in the last column of the table reveals that 
differences in loan size constraints between these groups are economically very small. 
Furthermore, it is the group of repeat clients that experiences significantly larger constraints at 
their first loans if they are initially older or larger. Taken these results together, the extent of 
observed credit constraints does not seem to (negatively) influence the incidence of borrowing 
repeatedly from the Bank. Therefore, I will pool all borrowers in the regression analysis. 
  The main measure of relationship strength is the loan number indicating how many 
interactions between the borrower and the Bank have taken place providing the Bank with the 
opportunity to monitor borrowers and to observe their repayment behavior. Figure 1 displays 
the Requested-granted ratio over the loan sequence for the subsample of repeat clients and its 
various subgroups based on the age and size indicators of asymmetric information.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
  Figure 1 shows that observed loan size constraints decrease considerably over an average 
loan sequence. For the full sample, loan size constraints decrease significantly in the 
beginning of the loan sequence from 1.24 to 1.07 between the first and the fifth loan.
7 Thus, 
using this more comprehensive measure of credit constraints confirms findings from previous 
studies that employ indirect or equilibrium outcome measures for credit availability (e.g. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010)). The observed decrease in loan 
size constraints is a first indication of the dynamic patterns that may be at work. On the Bank 
side, the application of dynamic incentives, which include increasing loan amounts upon due 
repayment (e.g. Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch (2005)), lead to a reduction in observed 
                                                 
7 To rule out that the observed pattern is driven by changes in the bank policy over years, I also investigate loan 
sequences that start in different years and find similar patterns no matter when bank relationships begin.    12 
constraints. Alternatively or simultaneously, learning from past experience on the borrower 
side may explain the observed pattern as well. An explanation which can be ruled out from 
these results is that borrowers overstate their demand as a reaction to past constraints because 
such a behavior would not decrease the ratio between observed requested and granted 
amounts during the first few interactions. 
Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that all subgroups of firms experience considerable 
reductions in loan size constraints in the beginning of their bank relationships. This decrease 
is significant and particularly strong between the first two loans for the Initially young (from 
1.32 to 1.15) and Initially small firms (from 1.31 to 1.16). Apart from that, the Initially young 
firms which have no or little proof of their viability available at that stage face significantly 
higher loan size constraints than the older firms in the beginning of their relationships which 
is consistent with the rationale provided by Martinelli (1997). Similarly, Initially small firms 
experience significantly higher credit constraints up to loan number five when comparing 
them to the initially larger firms. Note that all indicated differences are significant at the 0.01-
level using a Student’s t-test.  
Figure 1 suggests that the information which both Bank and borrowers may gather 
through repeated interactions reduce observed loan size constraints with this effect being most 
pronounced for the first few interactions. A crucial part of the following empirical analysis 
will be concerned with the determinants of loan size constraints and, most importantly, the 
underlying dynamics on the borrower and Bank side over the course of a bank relationship. 
   
3.3 Determinants of the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts 
  As a basis for the analysis of dynamic processes on both the demand and supply side, I 
start with studying the factors that influence the degree of observed loan size constraints in 
the sample in two steps. First, I estimate an OLS model for the full sample with Requested-
granted ratioi,k,t as the dependent variable. With larger values indicating higher credit 
constraints Requested-granted ratioi,k,t is the requested loan amount as a share of the granted 
loan amount of loan k firm i receives in period t:  
 
Requested-granted ratioi,k,t =  a + β1Ai,t + β2Fi,t + β3Lk + β4Bt + β5Tt + ei,k,t    (1) 
   
Ai,t is a vector of indicators measuring the level of asymmetric information, Fi,t is a vector 
that includes firm characteristics controlling for firm risk and capturing further aspects of firm 
opacity, while Lk is a vector of loan characteristics. Finally, Bt and Tt are vectors of branch   13 
and time dummies accounting for the branch-specific (such as local competition) and general 
(such as macroeconomic and monetary conditions, the Bank’s refinancing situation and the 
Bank’s prevailing interest rate and collateral requirements for small loans) environment at the 
time of loan disbursement.  
In a second step, I estimate outcome equation (1) as a panel model with firm fixed effects 
to control for any unobserved borrower heterogeneity that may have been ignored in the 
previous analysis and that may influence the Requested-granted ratio. In contrast to the OLS 
estimator, the fixed effects estimator only accounts for the within variation of all variables, 
i.e. their variation over a loan sequence for each borrower, and not for their variation between 
different borrowers. This concentrates the analysis on the factors that determine differences in 
credit constraints over the course of individual bank-borrower relationships. 
 
Indicators of asymmetric information 
The variable Times indicates the number of the current loan and measures the intensity of 
the bank-borrower relationship.
8 Most importantly, it captures the dynamic patterns that arise 
along a chain of interactions between borrowers and the Bank. To allow for non-linear effects 
I include the dummy variables Times_2, …, Times_5 (which pools interactions number five to 
nine because of the fewer observations in these categories and because the descriptive 
analysis has displayed that most of the action happens in the beginning of the relationship) 
and use Times_1 as the reference category.
9 
  Martinelli (1997) suggests that young firms without a credit history or reputation are 
initially loan size constrained to provide them with an incentive to repay and obtain larger 
loan amounts in the future. I include the dummy variable Initially young to capture whether a 
firm was young, i.e. its firm age was below or equal to two years, when borrowing the first 
time from the Bank. To study whether dynamic incentives are indeed particularly strong for 
initially young firms I assess the interaction effects Times_2*Initially young, …, 
Times_5*Initially young. Similarly, the dummy variable Initially small indicates whether a 
firm was comparatively small, i.e. its size in terms of total assets was below the median firm 
size, when borrowing for the first time from the Bank. To assess whether there is indeed a 
differential effect of initial firm size on credit constraints over loan sequences the interaction 
effects Times_2*Initially small,…, Times_5*Initially small are included. 
                                                 
8 I do not include the duration of a Bank relationship to measure the level of asymmetric information because it 
is highly correlated with Times. However, rerunning all regressions with Bank relationship instead of Times 
reveals qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results. 
9 I also test for the differences in adjacent time dummies and find that they are significant in all specifications.    14 
  When a borrower applies for a loan, it is the loan officer with whom interaction takes 
place and who collects all the borrower-specific data necessary for the subsequent decision on 
whether to grant a loan and under which conditions (see Berger and Udell (2002), Stein 
(2002) and for empirical papers using loan officer information e.g. Liberti (2005), Scott 
(2004, 2006), Uchida, Udell and Yamori (2006), Beck, Behr and Güttler (2009) and Liberti 
and Mian (2009)). If the information gathered by the loan officer cannot fully be transmitted 
within the bank, which is likely for qualitative soft information, part of it is lost in case a loan 
officer change takes place. This loss is most extreme when the loan officer leaves the bank 
but might even matter when responsibilities are rescheduled within the bank.
10 The variable 
Loan officer change is included in the analysis indicating whether the loan officer has 
changed during the duration of the previous loan. If there was a previous change, some of the 
effects of a close bank-relationship on the reduction of loan size constraints may be tempered. 
   
Firm and loan characteristics 
  The included firm characteristics are further indicators of asymmetric information and 
control for borrower risk. Sole proprietorships are more opaque than incorporated firms 
because they do not have to provide certified annual reports according to Bulgarian law, 
hence the dummy variable Sole proprietorship equals one if the firm is a sole proprietorship 
and zero otherwise. Borrowers that are highly indebted face a higher risk of default in case of 
external shocks to their income so that I introduce Leverage, the firm’s total debt as share of 
its total assets at the disbursement date of the loan. A firm with little financial scope 
(Disposable income (measured in log euro)) to react to unforeseen cuts to its income is more 
vulnerable to external shocks and thus more risky because the repayment of the loan may be 
endangered more easily. To account for all remaining differences in firm characteristics the 
regressions contain seven Industry dummies. 
  One loan characteristic which raises little concern to be endogenous to the determination 
of all other loan contract terms is the Fixed capital loan variable. It indicates whether a loan is 
for fixed capital financing or working capital otherwise, which is induced by the purpose of 
the loan and thus predetermined (exogenous) to the decision on other loan terms. If a loan is 
intended for fixed capital financing, the underlying asset may be sold in case of default 
lowering the risk associated with such loans. Similarly, an Annuity loan (dummy variable 
                                                 
10 The loan officer changes observed in the dataset mostly occur because loan officers are promoted within the 
Bank or because they leave the Bank. The Bank does not follow a policy to regularly rotate its loan officers 
internally to avoid too close relationships between clients and loan officers that might lead to decisions rather 
based upon personal considerations than objective judgements (see Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini (2010) for 
positive effects of loan officer rotation).   15 
which is one if the loan is an annuity loan and zero if it is a credit line or overdraft) may be 
considered less risky because of its regular repayment schedule.  
Finally, loan maturity is possibly endogenous to the determination of loan amount and its 
inclusion in the regressions would bias the estimates. Studying requested and granted loan 
amounts and maturities reveals that both loan terms are complements because for 67% of all 
loans they are adjusted into the same direction, i.e. requests for both loan terms are either 
higher, lower or equal to both granted loan terms. The Spearman rank correlation between the 
Requested-granted ratio and the ratio of requested to granted maturity is 0.4324 and 
significant (p-value <0.01) which means that the two variables are not independent. 
Therefore, I concentrate the main analysis on requested and granted loan amounts but will 
provide some further evidence on requested and granted maturities in the extensions.   
 
3.4 Requested and granted loan amounts and their development over time 
When borrowers and Bank interact repeatedly they both learn about the other party’s 
behavior and its reaction to the own behavior which, in turn, may influence the outcome of 
the following interaction. These dynamic aspects are studied in a panel model with firm fixed 
effects because the interest lies in the factors affecting changes in requested and granted loan 
amounts and their relation over borrowers’ loan sequences. The dependent variables are 
Requested amounti,k,t and Granted amounti,k,t indicating requested and granted loan amounts 
(in log euro) for loan k that firm i receives in period t: 
 
Requested amounti,k,t =  ai + β1Lag Requested-granted ratiok          
      + β2Ai,t + β3Fi,t + β4Lk + β5Tt + ei,k,t                (2) 
Granted amounti,k,t =  ai + β1Lag Requested-granted ratiok          
      + β2Ai,t + β3Fi,t + β4Lk + β5Tt + ei,k,t                (3) 
 
In this model ai includes the firm fixed effects, Ai,t is a vector of indicators of asymmetric 
information, while Fi,t and Lk are vectors of firm and loan characteristics. The vector Tt 
contains time dummies accounting for the macroeconomic environment as well as the Bank’s 
prevailing fixed contract terms for small loans at the time of loan disbursement.  
Lag Requested-granted ratio, the degree of credit constraints at the previous loan, is the 
key explanatory variable in these regressions accounting for the effect which the previous 
experience to receive a smaller than requested loan amount has on current behavior. To 
capture how requested and granted loan amounts evolve over a loan sequence the variable   16 
Times (measured by the dummy variables Times_3,…, Times_5 with Times_2 serving as the 
reference category) is included. The interaction effects Times_3*Lag Requested-granted 
ratio,…, Times_5*Lag Requested-granted ratio are included to study whether the relation 
between the intensity of the bank relationship and the requested or granted loan amount 
differs by the extent of credit constraints experienced during previous interactions. Loan 
officer change is used as an additional measure for the extent of asymmetric information and 
relationship strength. It is not only expected to be negatively related to granted loan amounts 
due to a loss in private information but also to requested loan amounts because borrowers 
often follow their loan officers resorting some of their financial activities to other banks. 
Requested and granted loan amounts will furthermore depend on firm and loan 
characteristics. Age, Assets and Disposable income control for credit risk, financial 
transparency as well as the investment opportunities of firms. Older and bigger firms are 
likely to plan larger investment projects thus requesting larger loan amounts. At the same 
time, they may also receive larger loan amounts because they are more financially 
experienced, less risky and more transparent. I further include Asset growth to control for the 
fact that previously loan size constrained firms may request smaller loan amounts than 
previously unconstrained borrowers simply because they are hampered in their growth 
options. Leverage is a measure of the firm’s already exhausted debt capacity and should be 
negatively related to requested and granted loan amounts. Finally, Fixed capital loan and 
Annuity loan are expected to be associated with larger granted loan amounts due to their 
relatively lower credit risk. Again, Requested maturity and Granted maturity are not included 
because they are complements to requested and granted amount. 
  
3.5 Summary statistics 
  Table 3 presents summary statistics for the indicators of asymmetric information and the 
loan and firm characteristics.
11 Panel A displays sample means for these variables over the 
loan sequence and shows that Requested amount and Granted amount increase considerably 
over a bank-borrower relationship nearly doubling on average between the first and the ninth 
loan. Early loans in a loan sequence are more likely to be used for fixed capital financing 
whereas later loans are more often intended for working capital purposes. Apart from that, 
firms tend to start their bank relationship rather with loans than other financial products 
having been with the bank for only 1.15 months on average when receiving their first loan. 
                                                 
11 The table displays the untransformed values for the variables Requested amount, Granted amount, Requested 
maturity, Granted maturity, Age, Assets and Disposable income.    17 
These observations indicate that bank relationships regularly start with investment loans and 
only later comprise other financial products such as current accounts with overdraft facilities. 
Loan officer changes seem to be a frequent phenomenon so that between 23% and 38% 
of loans are granted by loan officers different from those that granted the previous loan. While 
firms show relatively low levels of indebtedness with Leverage not exceeding 26%, the 
variables Sole proprietorship, Assets, Asset growth and Disposable income indicate that firms 
grow substantially over time. The variable Initially small supports this explanation. It reveals 
that the proportion of loans made to firms which were comparatively small when they started 
to borrow is stable up to the sixth loan, which means that the very small clients do not 
gradually drop out of the sample. Finally, the majority of firms take out up to four loans at 
this Bank. Since most of these loans have comparatively short maturities, there is nevertheless 
a sizeable number of borrowers with loan sequences of up to nine loans despite an 
observation period of only 4.5 years. This justifies the use of panel methods in the empirical 
analysis to account for the evolution of loan terms along these chains of interactions between 
Bank and borrowers. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
  Panel B of Table 3 presents statistics for the two subsamples of unconstrained vs. 
constrained loans. Interestingly, column (1) shows that those firms which receive the same as 
or a larger than requested loan amount exhibit only a slight difference in requested and 
granted maturities. On the contrary, column (2) shows that firms which are credit constrained 
are granted equivalently shorter than requested maturities. This is a further indication that 
loan amount and maturity are complementary contract terms rather than substitutes. The 
credit constrained firms in column (2) borrow on average less often, are more likely to be 
young and small at their first loan, are younger in general and have shorter bank relationships 
than the unconstrained firms (column (1)) so that they seem to be the less experienced 
borrowers. They are also clearly smaller in terms of total assets and disposable income 
implying that the Bank may deal with their possibly greater risk by limiting granted loan 
sizes. A t-test confirms that these differences in firm characteristics are statistically significant 
at the 0.01-level when comparing the two groups. Interestingly, both groups do not 
significantly differ in their Asset growth. 
   
   18 
4 Results 
 
4.1 Determinants of the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts 
  Table 4 displays the regression results on the determinants of the Requested-granted 
ratio based on estimations for both the full sample and the panel of repeat clients. Regressions 
for the full sample include industry, branch and year-month dummies, but they do not include 
the variable Loan officer change because for all first loans this variable is zero by definition 
and thus its effect is diluted. The regression for the subsample of repeat clients includes firm 
fixed effects to account for unobserved firm heterogeneity and year-month dummies. The 
branch dummies as well as the variables Initially young, Initially small and Sole 
proprietorship are excluded from this regression due to (almost) no within-variation. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
 
Effects of asymmetric information indicators and firm and loan variables 
   Column (1) of Table 4 presents OLS estimates for the full sample. The results confirm 
that firms with more intense bank relationships and more transparent and less risky firms 
experience lower observed credit constraints.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
  The variables Times_2, …, Times_5 capture the effect which the intensity of the bank-
borrower relationship has on observed loan size constraints for the initially older and larger 
firms. The more often such a firm borrows from the Bank, the less credit constrained it is with 
credit constraints decreasing most distinctly between the first two interactions (3.2%). Those 
firms that are Initially young or Initially small experience credit constraints that are higher 
than those for the initially older (5.7% on average) or initially larger (5.1% on average) firms. 
The significantly negative coefficients for the interaction effects of Times_2, …, Times_5 and 
Initially young and Initially small respectively indicate that the reduction of credit constraints 
over a loan sequence is more pronounced for initially younger and smaller firms. For instance, 
between the first two interactions Initially young firms experience on average an additional 
4.3% decrease in loan size constraints compared to initially older firms. For Initially small 
firms this additional decrease is 5.0%.   
  The additional firm and loan characteristics show that observed credit constraints also 
depend on the general financial transparency of the firm and the observable credit risk. Larger   19 
firms in terms of Disposable income and firms taking out a Fixed capital loan are less credit 
constrained. Since firms with more disposable income are less vulnerable in case of external 
shocks to their business and since fixed capital assets may be sold in case of default these 
loans may be considered as less risky. Besides, investments in fixed assets may be more 
difficult to be split which leaves less scope for loan size constraints. At the same time, firms 
that show a higher Leverage are more constrained further indicating that the Bank is 
concerned with observable credit risk when constraining credit. Surprisingly, Sole 
proprietorships which are considered to be less transparent than incorporated firms face lower 
credit constraints. Nevertheless, the Bank may assess them to be less risky because of their 
owners’ unlimited liability and because the firm management does not easily change. 
  These results provide information on the criterions that matter for observed credit 
constraints. While the economic impact of the additional firm characteristics is relatively 
small, being a young or small firm when starting the bank relationship are important factors of 
receiving smaller than requested loan amounts. The generally higher constraints for Initially 
young and Initially small firms indicate that the extent of (publicly) available information 
between borrowers matters for being credit constrained. Besides, the more pronounced 
reduction in observed credit constraints over time for the initially young and small firms 
implies that the positive information from due repayment is especially important for these 
borrower groups to reduce the Requested-granted ratio over multiple interactions. This 
complements the findings in Norden and Weber (2010) that the negative information from 
abnormal credit line usage leads to tighter terms on subsequent loans. In that sense, the 
Requested-granted ratio may also be interpreted as a measure of the firm’s credit worthiness. 
Finally, these results rule out that borrowers overstate their demand as a reaction to previous 
constraints. Such a dynamic process would not induce the observed reduction in the 




The results from the repeat client analysis presented in column (2) are very similar to 
those from the full sample in column (1). Thus, when focusing on borrowers’ loan sequences 
and controlling for unobserved borrower heterogeneity I also find that the intensity of the 
bank-borrower relationship and the initial firm age and size are important determinants of the 
extent of observed credit constraints. A Loan officer change leads to higher credit constraints, 
but the economic effect is relatively small (2.7%). This confirms the reasoning in Berger and   20 
Udell (2002) that not all of the soft information gathered by loan officers can be transformed 
into common knowledge within the Bank. An alternative explanation would be that the 
borrower and the loan officer were colluding leading to better loan terms than the borrower 
risk would justify. In this case, an increase in credit constraints after a loan officer change 
would imply a stricter, more objective assessment of the borrower’s risk and repayment 
capacity by the new loan officer. Furthermore, I find confirmation for the earlier result that 
more transparent and less risky (Disposable income, Fixed capital loan) borrowers are less 
credit constrained. Not surprisingly, Leverage does not play any significant role in this fixed 
effects regression since it varies very little over time. 
   
4.2 Requested and granted loan amounts and their development over time 
Employing a more comprehensive measure of credit constraints that incorporates loan 
demand has confirmed the positive relation between close bank relationships and credit 
availability established by previous studies that use indirect or equilibrium outcome measures 
of credit constraints (e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) and Ioannidou and Ongena 
(2010)). The approach so far has crucially relied on the assumption that the observed 
requested and granted loan amounts mirror ‘real’ demand and supply. Yet, they may also be 
mere strategic indications arising from previous experience with the same contract partner and 
the loan negotiation process. Therefore, I take the analysis one step further and shed light on 
the movements of requested and granted loan amounts over borrowers’ loan sequences. The 
structure of the dataset enables me to disentangle whether the observed reduction in credit 
constraints stems from the Bank’s willingness to provide more funds to more transparent 
borrowers as is generally assumed in the literature. Alternatively or simultaneously, the 
borrower might learn over time what is reasonable to request from the Bank, which would 
also lead to a decrease of credit constraints over loan sequences.
12   
Table 5 reports results for the determinants of requested and granted loan amounts with 
special focus on the influence of relationship measures and the dynamics that may drive the 
borrowers’ and the Bank’s decisions when contracting repeatedly.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
                                                 
12 This does not imply that the borrower may not be credit constrained at other banks. This does also not imply 
that the borrower would not prefer to realize a larger loan amount if it was possible. However, the structure of 
the dataset allows me to observe the evolution of borrowers’ requests over multiple interactions with the same 
lender and to draw conclusions on borrower learning from the results.    21 
Columns (1) and (2) contain estimates for the determinants of Requested amount. The 
explanatory variable of particular interest in these regressions is Lag Requested-granted ratio 
which indicates how constrained a borrower was at the previous loan. The estimates in 
column (1) reveal several interesting findings. The more credit constrained a borrower was at 
the previous loan, the lower the requested amount at the current loan. On average, a ten 
percent increase in loan size constraints at the previous loan decreases the requested amount 
at the current loan by 2.5%. Moreover, firms generally request larger loan amounts over the 
loan sequence (Times_3, …, Times_5). For instance, requested loan amounts for the third loan 
are by 16.6% higher than for the second loan. One reason may be that firms grow over time 
and therefore need to finance larger investments. This is supported by the positive relation 
between firm Age and the requested loan amount. Nevertheless, another explanation may be 
that especially the larger firms in the sample stay with the Bank for more interactions. I 
explicitly account for this possible drop-out problem in Table 6 by relating the number of 
loans a firm takes out to firm characteristics.  
To assess how the relation between the number of interactions between a firm and the 
Bank (Times_3, ..., Times_5) and the Requested amount is moderated by the experience to be 
credit constrained at the previous loan I introduce the interaction terms of both variables in 
column (2). Figure 2 illustrates the results and shows that, in the beginning of the relationship, 
the increase in requested loan amounts is flatter for those borrowers that experienced high 
credit constraints in the past. Thus, while borrowers increase their loan requests over time 
they seem to learn from previous credit constraints how much to reasonably request from this 
Bank and adapt their requested loan amounts during the first few interactions accordingly. 
This result is similar to the learning through negative feedback which Agarwal, Driscoll, 
Gabaix and Laibson (2008) find when studying customers’ reactions to paying (penalty) fees 
in the credit card market. Importantly, this result is not driven by constrained firms requesting 
comparatively lower loan amounts because they experience lower growth rates. Comparing 
the growth rates of previously constrained vs. unconstrained borrowers shows that constrained 
borrowers even grow significantly more (0.56 vs. 0.49, p-val.<0.05) than unconstrained 
borrowers. 
The firm level variables suggest that borrowers value the relationships with their loan 
officers. After a Loan officer change has occurred borrowers request considerably lower 
(17.7%) loan amounts. Often borrowers follow their loan officers to other banks doing some 
of their banking business with the new bank but not fully leaving this Bank because they 
already have an account there and value the services this Bank offers. The additional firm and   22 
loan controls show that larger (Assets) and faster growing (Asset growth) borrowers with a 
higher monthly repayment capability (Disposable income) request larger loan amounts while 
firms with a higher Leverage ask for smaller loans. Finally, since they presumably finance 
larger investments, loans intended for fixed capital financing and loans with a regular 
repayment schedule (Annuity loan) are requested with larger amounts than working capital 
loans and credit lines or overdrafts. 
Turning to the determinants of the Bank’s granted loan amounts, columns (3) and (4) 
reveal that all variables show the same signs as in the regressions for the firms’ requested loan 
amounts with the interesting exception of the variable Lag Requested-granted ratio and its 
interactions with Times_3, ..., Times_5. The results in column (3) show that, in accordance 
with borrowers requesting larger loan amounts over time, the Bank also grants larger loan 
amounts over a loan sequence. For instance, granted loan amounts for the third loan are by 
20.4% higher than for second loans. The more credit constrained a borrower was at the 
previous loan the more the Bank is willing to grant at the current loan but this effect is 
economically small. A ten percent increase in loan size constraints at the previous loan 
increases the granted amount at the current loan by 0.6% on average. Although this effect is 
not statistically significant in column (4), the significantly positive interaction terms 
Times_3*Lag Requested-granted ratio, ..., Times_5*Lag Requested-granted ratio indicate 
that the Bank grants relatively more to borrowers facing high in contrast to small constraints 
at their previous loans when moving along the loan sequence. Figure 3 displays that this effect 
is most pronounced during the first few interactions and levels off afterwards. 
The firm level variables reveal that granted loan amounts are considerably smaller after a 
Loan officer change with this effect being economically stronger (19.6%) than on the demand 
side. This may imply that indeed some proprietary information is lost when loan officers are 
assigned new portfolios or leave the Bank. Alternatively this finding may be a sign of 
previous collusion between the borrower and the loan officer leading to excessively large loan 
amounts. After a loan officer change, the new loan officer conducts a thorough financial 
analysis on which the decision about the granted loan terms are solely based. To investigate 
this issue more deeply, I replace the variable Loan officer change in all the regressions with 
an indicator measuring the number of loans a borrower has been with the same loan officer 
when taking out the current loan (results not reported here). It turns out that each additional 
interaction with the same loan officer increases requested loan amounts by 9% (p-val.<0.01) 
and granted loan amounts by 11% (p-val.>0.01) with this effect being stronger than the 
average effect of the Times dummies. Although there are a few relationships between   23 
borrowers and loan officers for which collusion might be a possible explanation because they 
last up to nine interactions, the average number of interactions with a loan officer is 1.7 for 
repeat clients leaving little room for collusion. Therefore, it seems as if the reduction in 
informational asymmetries especially in the beginning of a relationship and the partial loss of 
the acquired information during a loan officer change is the main driver of the observed 
decrease in loan amounts after a loan officer change.   
The other firm and loan level variables show that Granted amount is mainly determined 
by the firm’s financial transparency and credit risk. Older and larger firms (Age, Assets) and 
firms with more Disposable income are granted larger amounts while more indebted firms 
(Leverage) are granted smaller amounts. Also, loans that finance a fixed asset (Fixed capital 
loan) which may be sold in case of default and Annuity loans with regular repayment 
schedules and thus lower risk show higher granted amounts.   
Summarizing, being able to disentangle the dynamic patterns that arise when borrower 
and bank start a relationship and interact repeatedly reveals several interesting results. First, I 
find that both requested and granted loan amounts increase considerably over time. Second, 
the gap between requested and granted loan amounts decreases especially in the beginning of 
the relationship due to a convergence of both sides with requested amounts increasing more 
moderately and granted amounts increasing more strongly when borrowers experience high 
vs. low previous credit constraints. And third, I observe the effects on the borrowers’ side not 
to be driven by reduced firm growth of the credit constrained firms. These findings imply that 
borrowers react to the experience of receiving smaller than requested loan amounts by more 
moderate requests at their next loan application, thus avoiding being highly constrained again. 
Therefore, they seem to learn from the feedback they get from previous experiences.   
This learning process is possibly accompanied by the firms’ entering into other bank 
relationships. Although the data does not include a direct measure of the number of banks a 
firm deals with, comparing information on firms’ total liabilities and the amounts they receive 
at this Bank justifies the conclusion that a large fraction of firms has more than one source of 
credit, especially after the first few interactions with this Bank. Therefore, it may be 
unproblematic for many firms to adjust their requests at this Bank obtaining funds from other 
lenders at the same time.
13 Nevertheless, their repayment capacity should have increased over 
time according to the increased granted loan amounts at this Bank because Bulgaria has had a 
                                                 
13 I calculate an indicator for other bank relationships from the information I have and include it into the 
regressions specified in Table 5. It is significantly and positively related to both requested and granted amount 
while the effects of all other variables remain qualitatively unchanged. Similarly, Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and 
Srinivasan (2010) find for their sample of large firms that borrowing from a prior lender leads to better granted 
loan terms even if borrowers have multiple sources of external financing.    24 
public credit register during the whole observation period and a private credit bureau since 
2005 from which the Bank can gather information on a borrower’s various loans.  
At the same time, the Bank seems to make use of initial loan size constraints to overcome 
information and incentive problems increasing loan sizes disproportionately after due 
repayment when contracting repeatedly (e.g. Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch (2005) and 
Martinelli (1997)). This is in line with arguments that bank relationships are valuable because 
banks are able to collect and assess information in due course and benefit borrowers by better 




The previous analysis did not explicitly take into account that the number of loans a 
borrower stays with the Bank may depend on firm characteristics or previous experience with 
the Bank. Moreover, it did not deal with possible loan maturity constraints which may be 
prevalent besides loan size constraints. The following sections report results from extensions 
to the previous regressions accounting for these two issues. 
 
Sample attrition 
In the dataset, there is substantial attrition meaning that borrowers do not return to the 
Bank for another loan after repaying the current one or, at least, wait relatively long to take 
out another loan so that I cannot observe their coming back. It is plausible to assume that this 
process is not random but depends on borrower characteristics (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders 
and Srinivasan (2010)). On the one hand, borrowers may not come back to the Bank for 
another loan because they have generated enough internal revenues to finance future projects. 
Alternatively, borrowers may turn to another bank because they were highly credit 
constrained at this Bank or because other banks offer lower interest rates. Furthermore, 
borrowers may follow their loan officers to other banks because they feel that the relationship 
is more with the loan officer than with the bank as a whole. On the other hand, the Bank may 
have reasons to deny another loan to borrowers who have defaulted on their previous loan or 
whose repayment behavior has been inadequate. The Bank may not extend another loan if the 
firm’s financial situation has deteriorated or if the firm has proven not to be viable. 
Unfortunately, I can neither directly observe a borrower’s decision whether to ask for 
another loan nor the Bank’s decision to deny a loan application. However, the dataset’s 
information on previous credit constraints, loan officer changes, firm and loan characteristics   25 
as well as borrowers’ repayment behavior based on arrears allows me to deal with the attrition 
problem nevertheless. To account for the attrition process I follow the approach in 
Wooldridge (1995).
14 Firstly, I estimate probit regressions for each period (loan number) to 
obtain the probability of observing loan k based on the credit constraint and the firm and loan 
characteristics for loan k-1 as well as the borrower’s risk category (four categories depending 
on the days of arrears) at the time of repayment of loan k-1. Apart from that, I include two 
dummy variables indicating whether loan k-1 is an add-on loan which should decrease the 
probability to take out even another loan and whether it is a short-term loan which should 
increase the probability of a further loan. Interestingly, the extent of previous credit 
constraints does not seem to have a major impact on the decision to apply for a further loan. 
The other explanatory variables display the signs as expected by the above reasoning. 
Secondly, I calculate the respective inverse Mills ratios from these regressions and 
include them in the fixed effects regressions for the Requested amount and the Granted 
amount. A test of attrition bias is then a Wald test of the coefficients of the inverse Mills 
ratios being jointly equal to zero. Since the second-stage regressions include the inverse Mills 
ratios as additional regressors which depend on the first-stage probit parameter estimates I 
bootstrap the standard errors performing 400 replications to derive their correct values. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 6 reports the estimates for the determinants of Requested amount in columns (1) 
and (2) and of Granted amount in columns (3) and (4) after correcting for a possible attrition 
bias. The significant Chi²-statistics in all columns show that the null hypothesis of all Mills 
ratios being jointly zero can be rejected implying that there is attrition bias in the data. 
Nevertheless, all results from the basic regressions in Table 5 are qualitatively confirmed even 
after controlling for the attrition bias while the bootstrapped standard errors are somewhat 
larger than those adjusted for clustering at the firm level in Table 5. 
 
Loan maturity constraints 
The importance of the loan maturity as a monitoring device and in dealing with borrower 
risk has been established by theoretical (e.g. Flannery (1986), Diamond (1991) and Diamond 
                                                 
14 This approach is similar to the Heckman (1979) selection model which is widely used to account for non-
random sample selection in cross-sectional studies (examples in the finance literature are Puri, Rocholl and 
Steffen (2010), Cerqueiro (2008) and Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2008)). Modelling non-random attrition in a 
panel dataset extends to estimating a selection equation for each period. In my case this means to estimate for 
each loan number the probability that borrowers take out a subsequent loan.     26 
(2004)) as well as empirical papers (Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005), 
Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant (2008), Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) and 
Kirschenmann and Norden (2010)). The descriptive statistics in Table 3 suggest that amount 
and maturity are complementary loan terms for the majority of loans. The following analysis 
therefore concentrates on those loans for which the Bank only adjusts one of the two loan 
terms to assess whether and in which cases the Bank uses maturity constraints rather than loan 
size constraints to deal with borrower risk and agency problems. Table 7 reports descriptive 
statistics for the two groups of loans for which the Bank either adjusted maturity or amount. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Columns (1) and (2) include loans for which the granted amount equals the requested 
amount. These loans were either granted with a shorter than requested maturity (column (1)) 
or a longer than requested maturity (column (2)). They show that loans with a shorter than 
requested maturity carry comparatively small amounts but were requested with relatively long 
maturities. The asymmetric information indicators display that they are loans made early in a 
relationship. Interestingly, the firm characteristics, especially size (Assets) and repayment 
capacity (Disposable income), do not differ considerably for the two groups. In contrast, 
columns (3) and (4) show that the adjustment of the loan size crucially depends on firm 
characteristics and the extent of asymmetric information in the beginning of the relationship 
(Initially young, Initially small). This is in line with the results from the previous regression 
analysis. I conclude from these findings that the incidence of receiving a shorter than 
requested maturity mainly occurs if borrowers apply for a maturity that is obviously too long 
in comparison to their requested (and granted) amount. As this seems to mostly happen in 
early stages of the relationship, it is another indication for learning at the borrower side.     
In a next step, I assess the determinants of maturity constraints more formally.
15 I re-
estimate the regressions displayed in Table 4 with the dependent variable now being the ratio 
of requested to granted loan maturity. I restrict the estimation sample to those loans for which 
requested amount equals granted amount to assess whether the Bank uses maturity constraints 
instead. Except for the Time dummies the economic relevance of all explanatory variables is 
very small. Furthermore, Initially Young, Initially small and their interaction terms with the 
Times dummies are insignificant which confirms the descriptive findings in Table 7.  
                                                 
15 Detailed regression results are available from the author upon request.   27 
Finally, I re-estimate all specifications displayed in Tables 4 and 5 with the dependent 
variables being Requested maturity, Granted maturity or their ratio for the full sample. For the 
determinants of maturity constraints, it again turns out that the economic impact of the 
explanatory variables is relatively small with the exception of the Times dummies. The 
dynamic patterns for requested and granted maturity are qualitatively the same as in the 




This paper studies requested and granted loan amounts and their relation over a loan 
sequence for nearly 99,000 small loans granted by one bank in Bulgaria between April 2003 
and September 2007. Unlike previous studies I observe the firm’s requested loan terms from 
loan applications and the Bank’s granted loan terms as stated in the loan contract. This allows 
me to disentangle demand and supply effects behind observed credit constraints and to 
establish the dynamic patterns that arise on both sides when bank and borrower interact 
repeatedly.  
  Analyzing a more comprehensive measure of credit constraints which incorporates 
requested loan amounts shows that such observed credit constraints decrease significantly 
over loan sequences with this effect being particularly pronounced for firms that are 
comparatively young or small when starting to borrow from the Bank. Loan officer changes 
lead to higher observed credit constraints, which seems to be driven rather by the loss of 
private information than by a possible collusion between borrowers and their long-time loan 
officers. Finally, more transparent and less risky firms are less credit constrained.  
Taking the analysis one step further and studying the dynamics behind the observed 
reduction of credit constraints over a bank-borrower relationship I find that both requested 
and granted loan amounts increase over time. Interestingly, the results suggest that the gap 
between requested and granted loan amounts decreases in the beginning of the relationship 
because both sides converge. When previous credit constraints were large, requested amounts 
increase more moderately and granted amounts increase more strongly than in the case of 
small previous constraints. The Bank seems to make use of dynamic incentives to overcome 
information and agency problems increasing loan sizes disproportionately after due 
repayment when contracting repeatedly. While the Bank increases granted loan amounts when 
learning about borrowers’ risk and repayment behavior, borrowers seem to learn from the 
(negative) feedback they get from previous experiences with credit constraints at the Bank.   28 
One question that arises concerns the transferability of these results to other 
environments. On the one hand, concentrating the analysis on small loans from one bank in an 
emerging market provides an ideal ground for studying the influence of bank relationships on 
requested and granted loan terms because informational asymmetries are presumably severe. 
Furthermore, the loan granting process is the same for all observed loans reducing possible 
heterogeneity at this level. On the other hand, the bank and its loan contracts that are 
standardized with respect to interest rates and collateral requirements may seem special. 
Nevertheless, it provides a natural setting that allows gaining insights into the dynamics of 
requested and granted loan amounts in multiple interactions between borrowers and banks. 
Moreover, standardizing interest rates is not uncommon in other loan categories like mortgage 
loans or overdrafts. Finally, my empirical procedure is easily applicable in any other lending 
context and should thereby contribute to a better understanding of the processes behind 
observed loan contracting outcomes. 
The dynamic patterns found in this study complement and connect key elements of the 
literatures on relationship lending, demand and supply effects in bank lending and credit 
availability of small firms. However, the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts which I 
denote as observed credit constraints may as well be a measure of borrower bargaining power 
or capture the borrower’s financial literacy. Disentangling these various aspects with more 
comprehensive data (e.g. on borrowers’ different sources of credit - in markets with and 
without information sharing among lenders) and gaining deeper insights into the dynamics of 
bank and borrower behavior in bank lending seems to be a fruitful area of future research.   29 
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Table 1. Variable definitions 
   
     
Variable  Definition 
   
Dependent variables    
Requested-granted ratio  Requested loan amount as a share of granted loan amount (Log) 
Requested amount  Requested loan amount (Log EUR) 
Granted amount  Loan amount as stated in loan contract (Log EUR) 
   
Loan characteristics    
Requested maturity  Requested loan maturity (Log months) 
Granted maturity  Loan maturity as stated in loan contract (Log months) 
Fixed capital loan  Loan is for fixed capital financing (1=yes, 0=no) 
Annuity loan  Loan is an annuity loan vs. credit line or overdraft (1=yes, 0=no) 
Branch  Branch dummies which are one for the branch that granted the loan 
   
Asymmetric information indicators    
Times  Number of times the client borrows from bank at current loan 
Bank relationship  Months since first contact between bank and client at disbursement date 
Initially young  Firm age was below or equal to two years when first borrowing from 
bank (1=yes, 0=no) 
Initially small   Firm size (total assets) was below median firm size when first borrowing 
from the bank (1=yes, 0=no) 
Loan officer change  Firm experienced a loan officer change during duration of previous loan 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
   
Firm characteristics    
Age  Firm age at disbursement date (Log years) 
Sole proprietorship  Firm is sole proprietorship (1=yes, 0=no) 
Assets  Total assets of firm at disbursement date (Log EUR) 
Asset growth  Difference between total assets at current and last loan disbursement as a 
share of total assets at last loan disbursement 
Leverage  Total debt as share of total assets of firm at disbursement date  
Disposable income  Total disposable income per month at disbursement date (Log EUR) 
Industry 
Industry dummies which are one if firm belongs to one of the following 
sectors: Agriculture, Construction, Manufacturing, Trade, Transport, 
Tourism, Other services 
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Table 2. Asymmetric information and observed credit constraints at first loans 
 
This table reports the average Requested-granted ratio for Single loan clients (borrowers with only one loan) and 
Repeat clients (borrowers taking out more than one loan during the observation period), for different subsamples 
based on the asymmetric information indicators. Initially young (old) firms have a firm age below or equal to 
(above) two years when first borrowing from the Bank. Initially small (large) firms are of firm size below (equal 
to or above) the median firm size based on total assets when first borrowing from the Bank. The table also 
provides T-tests for differences between groups (difference) and F-tests for differences between pairs of groups 
(difference-in-difference). ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. Only first loans are 
included to separate the effect of the asymmetric information indicators from the effect of repeated interactions 
between borrowers and the Bank.  
           
   Requested-granted ratio 
  Single loan clients      Repeat clients            Diff / Diff-in-Diff 
N  32,832  20,350    
Initially young firms, N = 41, 848  1.33  1.32  0.01 
Initially old firms, N = 11,334  1.20  1.22   -0.02*** 
Diff / Diff-in-Diff  0.13***  0.10***  0.03** 
         
Initially small firms, N = 25,835  1.32  1.31  0.01 
Initially large firms, N = 27,347  1.15  1.16   -0.01** 
Diff / Diff-in-Diff  0.17***  0.15***  0.02** 
       
 
 
 Table 3. Loan and firm characteristics and asymmetric information indicators: descriptive statistics 
 
This table displays summary statistics for the loan, firm and asymmetric information variables. See Table 1 for definitions of all variables. Note that for all otherwise log-
transformed variables the statistics are calculated by using the original values. 
 
Panel A. Sample means by loan sequence 
                           
Times  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
                   
Loan characteristics                            
Requested-granted ratio  1.23  1.12  1.10  1.08  1.07  1.08  1.07  1.04  1.05 
Requested amount  5,318  5,397  5,985  6,515  7,347  7,990  9,223  8,949  9,344 
Granted amount  4,687  5,003  5,585  6,141  7,016  7,538  8,765  8,645  8,812 
Requested maturity  32.81  30.08  29.60  29.77  30.40  29.57  28.51  25.89  24.59 
Granted maturity  27.33  27.37  27.56  28.14  29.02  27.90  26.61  25.47  25.21 
Fixed capital loan  0.55  0.49  0.46  0.44  0.43  0.41  0.38  0.41  0.32 
Annuity loan  0.74  0.79  0.78  0.75  0.71  0.63  0.56  0.52  0.48 
                   
Asymmetric information indicators                         
Bank relationship  1.15  12.01  21.79  29.65  35.98  40.07  43.52  44.54  45.67 
Initially young  0.21  0.16  0.14  0.12  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.05 
Initially small  0.49  0.52  0.53  0.53  0.50  0.46  0.38  0.32  0.33 
Loan officer change    0.23  0.26  0.28  0.31  0.35  0.38  0.37  0.32 
                   
Firm characteristics                            
Age  7.49  8.77  9.73  10.41  11.11  11.41  11.75  11.81  11.92 
Sole proprietorship  0.91  0.93  0.92  0.91  0.89  0.86  0.83  0.79  0.76 
Assets  28,494  32,400  37,310  42,858  52,231  64,829  73,023  90,318  91,571 
Asset growth    0.62  0.45  0.38  0.31  0.33  0.16  0.13  0.15 
Leverage  0.11  0.17  0.18  0.21  0.23  0.25  0.25  0.26  0.25 
Disposable income  400  473  573  658  775  928  1,086  1,217  1,133 
N  53,182  24,150  11,628  5,450  2,503  1,185  544  234  111 
                   Panel B. Sample means for the subsamples of unconstrained vs. constrained loans 
 
***, **, * denote that variables are significantly different from each other at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level using 
a two-sided T-test.  
        
   Unconstrained  Constrained   
  (1)  (2)  (1) - (2) 
   N = 73,742  N = 25,245    
       
Loan characteristics          
Requested-granted ratio  0.98  1.74   -0.76*** 
Requested amount  5,033  7,255   -2,222*** 
Granted amount  5,187  4,763  424*** 
Requested maturity  29.27  37.83   -8.57*** 
Granted maturity  27.63  26.91  0.73*** 
Fixed capital loan  0.52  0.50  0.02*** 
Annuity loan  0.76  0.73  0.03*** 
       
Asymmetric information indicators          
Times  1.94  1.64  0.30*** 
Bank relationship  10.44  6.86  3.58*** 
Initially young  0.17  0.22   -0.05*** 
Initially small  0.47  0.60   -0.13*** 
Loan officer change  0.25  0.27   -0.02*** 
       
Firm characteristics          
Age  8.61  7.79  0.82*** 
Sole proprietorship  0.92  0.91  0.01 
Assets  35,259  25,502  9,757*** 
Asset growth  0.51  0.47  0.04 
Leverage  0.14  0.15   -0.01*** 
Disposable income  505  387  118*** 
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Table 4. Determinants of observed credit constraints 
 
Column (1) includes results for the full sample from an OLS regression and column (2) reports results from a 
fixed effects regression for the subsample of Repeat clients (loans disbursed to firms that take out more than one 
loan from the Bank during the observation period). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and account for 
clustering at the firm level. The dependent variable Requested-granted ratio is the requested loan amount as a 
share of the granted loan amount and indicates the extent of credit constraints. All explanatory variables are 
defined in Table 1. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
            
  (1)  (2) 
  Full sample  Repeat clients 
        
Times_2  -0.032***    -0.065***   
  (0.003)    (0.005)   
Times_3  -0.040***    -0.090***   
  (0.004)    (0.008)   
Times_4  -0.043***    -0.107***   
  (0.005)    (0.010)   
Times_5  -0.055***    -0.141***   
  (0.006)    (0.000)   
Initially young  0.057***       
  (0.004)       
Times_2*Initially young  -0.043***    -0.026***   
  (0.006)    (0.008)   
Times_3*Initially young  -0.049***    -0.020*   
  (0.008)    (0.011)   
Times_4*Initially young  -0.042***    -0.021   
  (0.013)    (0.016)   
Times_5*Initially young  -0.071***    -0.052***   
  (0.014)    (0.020)   
Initially small  0.051***       
  (0.004)       
Times_2*Initially small  -0.050***    -0.049***   
  (0.004)    (0.005)   
Times_3*Initially small  -0.058***    -0.053***   
  (0.005)    (0.007)   
Times_4*Initially small  -0.079***    -0.073***   
  (0.008)    (0.010)   
Times_5*Initially small  -0.071***    -0.058***   
  (0.008)    (0.011)   
Loan officer change      0.027***   
         (0.004)    
Sole proprietorship  -0.029***       
  (0.004)       
Assets  -0.026***    -0.016***   
  (0.001)    (0.004)   
Leverage  0.065***    0.043***   
  (0.006)    (0.011)   
Disposable income  -0.004***    -0.013***   
   (0.001)     (0.003)    
Fixed capital loan  -0.018***    -0.007**   
  (0.002)    (0.003)   
Annuity loan  -0.003    0.000   
   (0.008)     (0.011)    
Constant  0.448***    0.368***   
   (0.019)     (0.037)      39 
Table 4. Determinants of observed credit constraints (cont’d) 
 
Observations  98,987  64,075 
Method  OLS  Panel FE 
R² (adjusted / within)  0.069  0.040 
Industry-fixed effects  yes  no 
Firm-fixed effects  no  yes 
Branch-fixed effects  yes  no 
Time-fixed effects  yes   yes  
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Table 5. Requested and granted loan amounts over loan sequences: dynamic effects 
 
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions for the subsample of Repeat clients (loans disbursed to 
firms that take out more than one loan from the Bank during the observation period). Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses and account for clustering at the firm level. The dependent variables are Requested amount which 
is the requested loan amount in log EUR in columns (1) and (2) and Granted amount which is the granted loan 
amount in log EUR in columns (3) and (4). All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
                          
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Repeat clients  Repeat clients  Repeat clients  Repeat clients 
Dependent variable  Requested amount  Requested amount  Granted amount  Granted amount 
Lag Requested-granted ratio  -0.247***    -0.066**    0.056***    -0.029   
  (0.020)    (0.027)    (0.019)    (0.027)   
Times_3  0.168***    0.207***    0.204***    0.185***   
  (0.015)    (0.016)    (0.014)    (0.015)   
Times_4  0.301***    0.335***    0.359***    0.345***   
  (0.025)    (0.025)    (0.024)    (0.025)   
Times_5  0.396***    0.424***    0.474***    0.460***   
  (0.037)    (0.037)    (0.036)    (0.036)   
Times_3*Lag Requested-granted ratio      -0.368***        0.194***   
      (0.038)        (0.036)   
Times_4*Lag Requested-granted ratio      -0.316***        0.093*   
      (0.055)        (0.053)   
Times_5*Lag Requested-granted ratio      -0.186***        0.104*   
         (0.058)           (0.055)    
Loan officer change  -0.177***    -0.178***    -0.196***    -0.196***   
   (0.012)     (0.012)     (0.012)     (0.012)    
Age  0.130*    0.152**    0.130*    0.121*   
  (0.075)    (0.075)    (0.073)    (0.072)   
Assets  0.064***    0.067***    0.091***    0.090***   
  (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.021)   
Asset growth  0.055***    0.053***    0.045***    0.046***   
  (0.016)    (0.016)    (0.015)    (0.015)   
Leverage  -0.427***    -0.424***    -0.462***    -0.463***   
  (0.041)    (0.040)    (0.040)    (0.040)   
Disposable income  0.114***    0.114***    0.117***    0.117***   
   (0.012)     (0.012)     (0.011)     (0.011)    
Fixed capital loan  0.371***    0.372***    0.377***    0.376***   
  (0.012)    (0.012)    (0.012)    (0.012)   
Annuity loan  0.525***    0.523***    0.502***    0.503***   
   (0.033)     (0.033)     (0.032)     (0.032)    
Constant  6.061***    5.959***    5.531***    5.578***   
   (0.282)     (0.277)     (0.275)     (0.277)    
Observations  40,345    40,345    40,345    40,345   
Method  Panel FE    Panel FE    Panel FE    Panel FE   
R² (within)  0.224    0.228    0.243    0.244   
Industry fixed effects  no    no    no    no   
Firm-fixed effects  yes    yes    yes    yes   
Branch fixed effects  no    no    no    no   
Time-fixed effects  yes     yes     yes     yes    
                 
   41 
Table 6. Sample attrition 
 
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions for the subsample of Repeat clients (loans disbursed to 
firms that take out more than one loan during the observation period). Standard errors (reported in parentheses) 
are bootstrapped to derive their correct values in the two-step procedure. In the first step (not reported) inverse 
Mills ratios are estimated to account for sample attrition which are included as regressors in the reported second-
stage regressions. Chi²-statistics from a Wald test of the joint significance of the inverse Mills ratios are reported 
as well. The dependent variables are Requested amount which is the requested loan amount in log EUR in 
columns (1) and (2) and Granted amount which is the granted loan amount in log EUR in columns (3) and (4). 
All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
                          
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Repeat clients  Repeat clients  Repeat clients  Repeat clients 
Dependent variable  Requested amount  Requested amount  Granted amount  Granted amount 
Lag Requested-granted ratio  -0.247***    -0.064**    0.059***    -0.028   
  (0.019)    (0.027)    (0.019)    (0.027)   
Times_3  0.303***    0.338***    0.327***    0.309***   
  (0.038)    (0.038)    (0.037)    (0.037)   
Times_4  0.450***    0.479***    0.507***    0.496***   
  (0.044)    (0.044)    (0.043)    (0.043)   
Times_5  0.601***    0.625***    0.678***    0.667***   
  (0.059)    (0.059)    (0.057)    (0.057)   
Times_3*Lag Requested-granted ratio      -0.363***        0.199***   
      (0.036)        (0.036)   
Times_4*Lag Requested-granted ratio      -0.313***        0.096*   
      (0.054)        (0.052)   
Times_5*Lag Requested-granted ratio      -0.202***        0.102*   
         (0.056)           (0.056)    
Loan officer change  -0.153***    -0.155***    -0.173***    -0.173***   
   (0.013)     (0.013)     (0.013)     (0.013)    
Age  0.200**    0.221***    0.189**    0.181**   
  (0.085)    (0.085)    (0.083)    (0.082)   
Assets  0.063***    0.066***    0.088***    0.087***   
  (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.021)   
Asset growth  0.054***    0.052***    0.046***    0.046***   
  (0.015)    (0.015)    (0.015)    (0.015)   
Leverage  -0.411***    -0.408***    -0.449***    -0.451***   
  (0.040)    (0.040)    (0.040)    (0.040)   
Disposable income  0.114***    0.114***    0.117***    0.117***   
   (0.012)     (0.011)     (0.011)     (0.011)    
Fixed capital loan  0.363***    0.364***    0.369***    0.368***   
  (0.013)    (0.013)    (0.012)    (0.012)   
Annuity loan  0.551***    0.548***    0.526***    0.528***   
   (0.033)     (0.033)     (0.032)     (0.032)    
Constant  6.397***    6.276***    6.040***    6.093***   
   (0.277)     (0.279)     (0.277)     (0.276)    
Chi²-statistic: test of joint significance 
of Mills ratios  50.00***     48.70***     49.10***     50.49***    
Observations  40,234    40,234    40,234    40,234   
R² (within)  0.226    0.230    0.246    0.247   
Industry fixed effects  no    no    no    no   
Firm-fixed effects  yes    yes    yes    yes   
Branch fixed effects  no    no    no    no   
Time-fixed effects  yes     yes     yes     yes    Table 7. Maturity constraints 
 
This table displays summary statistics for the loan, firm and asymmetric information variables for the two subsamples of loans for which either only maturity or only amount is 
adjusted in the loan granting process. See Table 1 for definitions of all variables. Note that for all otherwise log-transformed variables the statistics are calculated by using the 
original values. 
              
   Requested amount = Granted amount  Requested maturity = Granted maturity 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Requested maturity > Granted 
maturity 
Requested maturity < Granted 
maturity 
Requested amount > Granted 
amount 
Requested amount < Granted 
amount 
Loan characteristics             
Requested amount  4,866  5,417  8,323  6,643 
Granted amount  4,866  5,417  6,075  8,652 
Requested maturity  37.27  20.67  30.61  34.13 
Granted maturity  25.48  28.42  30.61  34.13 
Fixed capital loan  0.54  0.48  0.48  0.59 
Annuity loan  0.76  0.77  0.72  0.67 
          
Asymmetric information indicators             
Times  1.65  2.02  1.83  2.08 
Bank relationship  7.37  10.79  8.90  12.28 
Initially young  0.18  0.17  0.20  0.15 
Initially small  0.45  0.48  0.54  0.38 
Loan officer change  0.25  0.25  0.27  0.27 
          
Firm characteristics             
Age  8.25  8.60  8.20  8.92 
Sole proprietorship  0.93  0.90  0.88  0.86 
Assets  33,963  36,509  33,796  49,201 
Asset growth  0.68  0.46  0.43  0.50 
Leverage  0.13  0.16  0.17  0.18 
Disposable income  491  499  484  619 
         Figure 1. The Requested-granted ratio by loan sequence 
 
This figure displays the evolution of the Requested-granted ratio, the indicator for the extent of observed credit 
constraints,  over  the  loan  sequence  for  the  full  sample  and  different  subsamples  based  on  the  asymmetric 
information indicators. Initially young (old) firms have a firm age below or equal to (above) two years when first 
borrowing from the Bank. Initially small (large) firms are of firm size below (equal to or above) the median firm 








































































































Initially large firms  44 
Figure 2. Requested loan amounts and the extent of previous credit constraints 
 
This figure displays the effect of high vs. low previous credit constraints (Lag Requested-granted ratio) on the 
relation between Requested amount and the Times dummies. See Table 1 for definitions of all variables. High 
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Figure 3. Granted loan amounts and the extent of previous credit constraints 
 
This figure displays the effect of high vs. low previous credit constraints (Lag Requested-granted ratio) on the 
relation between Granted amount and the Times dummies. See Table 1 for definitions of all variables. High 
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